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Duquesne Law Review
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ALIENS-The United States Supreme Court has
held that state welfare laws discriminating against aliens violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and encroach
upon the exclusive federal control of immigration.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
The Graham decision involved two cases originating in Arizona and
Pennsylvania that were consolidated on appeal.1 The Arizona statute
required a welfare recipient either to be a United States citizen or to
have resided in the United States for fifteen years. 2 The Pennsylvania
statute denied state public assistance to all aliens.3 Both Arizona and
Pennsylvania sought to justify their restrictions by asserting the state's
"special public interest" of favoring its own citizens over aliens in the
distribution of welfare benefits. 4
Mr. Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court, rejected this argu-
ment upon two grounds. The primary reason for holding these laws
unconstitutional was that they were a form of invidious discrimina-
tion,5 and therefore, incompatible with the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The Court stated that classifications based
on alienage are "inherently suspect" and hence subject to strict judi-
cial scrutiny.6 Since the Court found that the state had no compelling
governmental interest in passing such laws, it held that the statutes
contravened the fourteenth amendment. 7
As additional support for the decision, the Court found that the
statutes violated the supremacy clause. Since the Constitution grants
Congress power to "establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization,"8 and
Congress has done so,9 any substantial state interference in immigra-
tion and naturalization proceedings is unconstitutional. The Court
held that state alien residency requirements are tantamount to a state
making an "assertion of a right, inconsistent with federal policy, to
deny entrance and abode. Since such laws encroach upon exclusive fed-
eral power, they are constitutionally impermissible.' 10
1. Graham v. Richardson, 313 F. Supp. 34 (D.C. Ariz. 1970); Sailer v. Leger, 321 F.
Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1970). In both cases the district courts entered judgments for the
alien plaintiffs and the states appealed.
2. ARIZ. REv. STAT. Ann. § 46-233 (1962).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432(2) (1968).
4. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
5. Id. at 376.
6. 403 U.S. at 376.
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
9. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., §§ 1421-27 (1964).
10. 403 U.S. at 380.
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Although Graham does not revolutionize the law regarding alien
rights or welfare programs, the decision is significant; it curtails state
power to regulate aliens, formerly justified as being part of a state's
special public interest." The most notable part of the decision is that,
for the first time, the Court has enunciated the doctrine that classi-
fications based on alienage are inherently suspect and therefore subject
to a strict equal protection test.12
Two tests are applied to see if a classification violates the equal pro-
tection clause. The traditional test forbids classifications only if they
have no rational basis and are purely arbitrary. 3 The second and more
stringent test requires the state to show that the classification is neces-
sary because of a compelling state interest. Application of the com-
pelling interest test is limited to two areas: 1) classifications affecting
fundamental rights, 14 and 2) classifications that are inherently suspect.' 5
Prior to Graham, the classifications held to be suspect were those based
on race,16 nationality, 7 or wealth.'8 Statutes of this type are subject
to rigid judicial scrutiny' 9 and the burden of proof is on the state to
justify them.2 0 Suspect classifications can only be justified by demon-
strating a compelling state interest,21 as opposed to the rational rela-
tionship standard under the traditional test.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court in Graham covertly injected
another classification into the suspect area, i.e., any classification based
on alienage. Mr. Justice Blackmun said that: "[T]he Court's decisions
have established that classifications based on alienage, like those based
on nationality or race, are inherently suspect .... -22 An examination
of prior case law does not substantiate this.
In an attempt to give credence to its position that alienage classi-
11. Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
12. 403 U.S. at 376.
13. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); see also 44 TUL. L. REv. 363, 365
(1970), where it is stated that under the traditional test a classification is not arbitrary
if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. Furthermore, a
statute will not be found unconstitutional because of an illicit legislative motive, provided
the classification is directly related to a legitimate governmental function. Under the
traditional test the Court will not consider the wisdom or morality of an otherwise valid
classification.
14. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1970).
15. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
16. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
17. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
18. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See also Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 184 (1941), (Jackson, J., concurring).
19. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
20. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
21. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
22. 403 U.S. at 372.
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fications had previously been inherently suspect, the Court cited two
cases. It relied on a footnote in United States v. Carolene Products
Company,23 that speaks of legislation regarding a "discrete and insular"
minority.24 The Graham Court stated that aliens are a prime example
of such a minority, and therefore, such a classification is suspect and
should be given "heightened judicial solicitude." 25 The validity of
such reasoning is questionable for two reasons: first, in 1938 the Caro-
lene Court felt it unnecessary even to consider whether legislation
restricting minorities should be given more searching judicial in-
quiry; 26 and second, the "discrete and insular minorities" discussed
in the footnote were religious, national, and racial minorities,27 not
aliens.
The other case the Court relied on in finding classifications based
on alienage inherently suspect was Takahashi v. Fish & Game Com-
mission.28 In Takahashi, a California statute barring issuance of com-
mercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible for citizenship was declared
unconstitutional. The Court stated that: "[T]he power of a state to
apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhabitants as a class is confined
within narrow limits." 29 The Graham Court used this quotation to
convey the idea that Takahashi stood for a strict application of the
equal protection clause. While it is true that both the above quotation
and the Takahashi holding limited the ability of the state to legislate
against aliens, they did so on the basis that the state had no special
public interest for passing such a discriminattory law,30 and therefore,
the classification was unconstitutional under the traditional test of
equal protection. Nowhere in Takahashi did the Court state that alien
classifications are inherently suspect or subject to a strict equal pro-
tection test.
The Court tortured prior case law in order to squeeze aliens into
the inherently suspect area-forcing states to prove a compelling state
interest for such laws. It is suggested that a much more logical argu-
ment for applying a strict equal protection test was possible: the stat-
utes in question infringed upon a fundamental right, and therefore,
violated the equal protection clause.
23. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
24. Id. at 152-153, n. 4.
25. 403 U.S. at 372.
26. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 (1938).
27. Id.
28. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
29. Id. at 420.
30. Id.
282
Vol. 10: 280, 1971
Recent Decisions
Precedent does exist for such a finding, especially in light of Shapiro
v. Thompson.3x There the Court found unconstitutional, minimum
state residence requirements for welfare recipients. The Court stated
that such laws had the effect of preventing a welfare recipient from
moving to a state with such a requirement. It applied a strict equal
protection test because the residency requirement encroached upon a
fundamental right, the right to travel.32 Similarly, when a state limits
welfare benefits to United States citizens, it has the effect of preventing
alien welfare recipients from moving to that state. So, by analogy,
citizenship requirements should also violate the fundamental right of
interstate movement.
The probable reason for the Court's hesitancy to make such a hold-
ing is that they have never stated that aliens have the same right to
travel as citizens. However, in Shapiro, the Court did not ascribe the
right to travel to any particular constitutional provision, but instead
cited United States v. Guest,33 where it was held that:
The constitutional right to travel from one state to another oc-
cupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal
Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly
recognized.
The right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The
reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so elementary was
conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of
the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, free-
dom to travel throughout the United States has long been recog-
nized as a basic right under the Constitution.34
Since the Court has not limited the source of the right to travel to
one section of the Constitution, but has defined the right in such
broad and strong terms, extension of this right to aliens could be easily
justified. 35 The use of such a rationale, which is a logical extension of
Shapiro3 6 would have negated the need for the Court to enlarge the
inherently suspect area, and would have produced a more palatable
decision.
John J. Reid
31. 394 U.S. 618 (1970).
32. Id.
33. 383 U.S. 745 (1965).
34. Id. at 758.
35. See Truax v. Raich 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
36. See Comment, Residency Requirements after Shapiro v. Thompson, 70 COL. L. REV.
134 (1970).
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